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Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power
Curtis A. Bradley* & Eric A. Posner**
August 1, 2006
Abstract. A recent debate about the Bush administration’s use of
presidential signing statements has raised questions about their function,
legality, and value. We argue that presidential signing statements are legal
and that they provide a useful way for the president to disclose his views
about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation. Although President
Bush has challenged more statutory provisions in signing statements than
prior administrations have, his signing statements are similar in many
respects to the signing statements issued by prior presidents, such as
President Clinton. In addition, basic tenets of positive political theory
suggest that signing statements do not undermine the separation of powers
or the legislative process and that, under certain circumstances, they can
provide relevant evidence of statutory meaning.

I. Introduction
Presidential signing statements are short documents that presidents often issue
when they sign a bill. They first appeared about two centuries ago, and they have been
used routinely since the New Deal. Presidents use signing statements to describe a bill in
general terms; to explain its purpose; to praise the bill’s sponsors or supporters; to
criticize Congress for going too far or not far enough in addressing the problem the bill is
supposed to solve; to advance particular interpretations of specific provisions of the bill;
to explain how officials in the executive branch will implement the bill; to explain how
the bill will interact with existing statutes; and to remind Congress of the president’s
constitutional powers. A brief controversy about the Reagan’s administration’s use of
signing statements flared up in the mid-1980s but had no lasting effect. Hundreds of
signing statements have been issued since then but until recently no one paid much
attention to them. Courts would occasionally use them to interpret statutes, but usually in
a very modest way. Pundits and political opponents might take umbrage at a particular
claim in a signing statement but no one attacked the institution itself. All this changed
about a year ago, and suddenly the signing statement, as an institution, has become a
topic of heated political debate.
In December 2005, President Bush issued a signing statement for the Detainee
Treatment Act, which implied that the Act’s prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and
*
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degrading treatment did not bind the executive branch.1 In March 2006, President Bush
issued a signing statement for the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, in which he asserted
that he had the authority to ignore certain reporting requirements.2 Both of these events
caught the attention of the media. Also, in January 2006, during Justice Samuel Alito’s
confirmation hearings, it was revealed that, as a Justice Department lawyer in the Reagan
administration, Alito had drafted a memo advocating increased use of signing statements
in order to influence courts’ interpretations of statutes.3 Alito’s critics argued that the
memo showed that, as a Supreme Court justice, he would be too friendly to the executive
branch.
The next step was to link together what might have remained episodic
controversies, and connect them to the widely credited claim that the Bush administration
had taken extreme positions on executive authority in its legal defense of its war-onterror policies. Several members of the media made this connection early on,4 but the
spark was applied to the fuel on April 30, 2006, when a Boston Globe article asserted that
Bush had “challenged” 750 statutes in signing statements, far more than any other
president.5 This article provoked further controversy, including increasingly strident
condemnations of the signing statement in the media.6 In early June, the American Bar
Association appointed a task force “to examine constitutional and legal issues raised by
the practice of presidents of the United States of attaching legal interpretations to federal
legislation they sign.”7 On June 27, the Senate held hearings on the signing statement,
during which Republican Arlen Specter expressed concerns about Bush’s signing
statements, and Democrat Patrick Leahy called them a “grave threat to our constitutional
system of checks and balances.”8 Academics have also leapt into the fray.9 And in July
2006, the ABA task force issued a statement opposing “as contrary to the rule of law and
1

See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005).
2
Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Mar. 9,
2006).
3
See Christopher Lee, Alito Once Made Case for Presidential Power, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 2006, at A11;
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Using Presidential Signing Statements to Make Fuller Use of the President’s
Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting Law (Feb. 5, 1986), available at
http://www/archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-89-269-box60-SG-LSWGAlitotoLSWG-Feb 1986.pdf.
4
See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Sign Here: Presidential Signing Statements Are More Than Just Executive
Branch Lunacy, Slate, Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.slateuk.com/id/2134919/.
5
Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of His Office, Boston
Globe, Apr. 30, 2006.
6
See, e.g., Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, New York Times, May 6, 2006; Elizabeth Drew,
Power Grab, New York Review of Books, June 22, 2006.
7
Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine,
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/ (last visited July 18, 2006).
8
Jonathan Weisman, Bush’s Challenges of Laws He Signed is Criticized, Wash. Post, June 28, 2006,
at A09.
9
See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential
Signing Statements, 35 Presidential Studies Q. 515 (2004); Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the
President’s Authority to Refuse to Enforce the Law (June 2006), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kinkopf-Signing%20Statements%20and%20President's%20Authority.pdf;
Richard A. Epstein, The Problem with Presidential Signing Statements, Chicago Tribune, July 16, 2006.
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our constitutional system of separation of powers, the issuance of presidential signing
statements that claim the authority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce
all or part of a law the President has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner
inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress.”10
This controversy is puzzling. Signing statements provide public information about
a president’s views of a statute and thus would seem to promote dialogue and
accountability. Furthermore, if courts pay little attention to them, it is not clear how they
can increase the President’s authority vis-à-vis Congress. Some critics have pointed out
that signing statements are sometimes instructions to subordinates, and so an aggressive
signing statement could, in theory, direct officials in the executive branch, including
prosecutors and agency personnel, not to enforce statutes on the basis of dubious
constitutional theories.11 But it is already widely recognized that the president has
considerable authority to allocate enforcement resources by giving priority to some
statutes and not to others, and to order his agents to enforce statutes according to his
interpretations of them. He certainly does not need a signing statement to do this; he
could just write a memorandum to his subordinates. If his subordinates fail to enforce the
law properly, they might be compelled to act by courts, or Congress might retaliate;
whether the failure was the result of a signing statement or some other order or document
is immaterial.
All of this suggests that the real concern is not with the institution of signing
statements but is rather with the Bush administration’s underlying views of executive
power. Unfortunately, the media and even much of the academic work on signing
statements ignore this distinction, and instead imply that the signing statement is
intrinsically suspect. The ABA task force, for example, offers itself as a critique of the
signing statement but is really an argument that the president has an obligation to enforce
all statutes that are enacted—an entirely different argument which, incidentally, is much
more complex than the task force’s two-page analysis suggests.12 A possible reason for
this state of affairs is that the Bush administration’s constitutional claims are extremely
hard to evaluate, as a matter of political and constitutional theory, so it is tempting to use
the signing statement as a kind of proxy for the Bush administration’s underlying
constitutional claims. The number of signing statements is taken as a quantitative index
of the Bush administration’s excesses, with the extreme nature of a few of the signing
statements used to bolster this claim. In a now forgotten episode of the Clinton
10

American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of
Powers Doctrine, Report (2006), available at: http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/
aba_final_signing_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf. The recommendation had not been
voted on by the ABA’s voting body at the time of this writing.
11
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 9.
12
See Task Force, supra note 7, at 18-19. We criticize the arguments below. For now, we will just
point out that the Task Force makes the broad argument that the President can never refuse to enforce
statutes that he believes are unconstitutional, without attempting to reconcile this position with the
substantial legal and historical materials that suggest the contrary, including materials surveyed in an Office
of Legal Counsel memorandum by Walter Dellinger that the Task Force cites and quotes from in its report.
See id. at 13. At one point in its report, however, the Task Force appears to recognize that sometimes it will
be appropriate for a president to decline to enforce a statutory provision he believes to be unconstitutional,
and that a signing statement can be an appropriate vehicle for expressing this intention. See id. at 23.
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administration, Republican critics similarly complained that Clinton issued too many
executive orders, and used them to circumvent Congress’s powers.13 The problem with
this argument is the same as the problem with the argument against signing statements:
the relevant question is not how many documents are issued, but the content of the
documents, which is much harder to criticize and evaluate than the number.
In this Essay, we try to clear up some of the controversy over signing statements
in general and the Bush administration’s use of them in particular. In doing so, we make
two principal contributions to the debate. First, we present a more nuanced empirical
assessment of the Bush administration’s use of signing statements, focusing in particular
on a quantitative and qualitative comparison of the signing statement practices of Bush
and Clinton. Second, we use positive political theory—the most sophisticated work on
legislative institutions and statutory interpretation—to assess the institutional
implications of signing statements.
Part II briefly describes the history of signing statements and argues that the Bush
administration’s practice, although different in degree from that of other recent
presidents, is not different in kind. As we will explain, even if Bush’s views about
executive power are more aggressive than (say) Clinton’s (which is not as clear as most
people seem to think), he has used the signing statement in roughly the same manner as
his predecessors, and—as far as one can tell—to more or less the same effect. We should
make clear at the outset, however, that the purpose of this Essay is not to evaluate Bush’s
views about executive power, although we will point out that these views, in broad
contours, do not seem substantially different from those of his recent predecessors, at
least as they appear in the signing statements.14
In Part III, we reject the simplistic legal criticisms of the signing statement that
have been advanced by a few scholars, politicians, and journalists. This is mainly a stagesetting exercise because it turns out that the most plausible critiques of the signing
statement are not formalistic legal arguments but are based on more general institutional
concerns. Part IV addresses these institutional arguments, which can be mainly found in
the positive political theory literature. We argue that these institutional arguments, on
inspection, turn out to be weak and that the institution of the signing statement does not
present a serious threat to either the separation of powers or the legislative process.
13

See Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power 219
(2001). For some Clinton-era media reports, see Jonathan Weisman, Wielding the Power of the President’s
Pen, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 22, 1999, at 3A; Editorial, The Intruders, Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2000, at
p. A22 (“This final year is going to bring a paroxysm of regulatory intrusion – through agency actions or
Mr. Clinton’s continued abuse of executive orders.”).
14
Former Clinton officials argue that Bush’s views about executive power are unreasonable, whereas
Clinton’s were reasonable. See, for example, the essays contributed to a symposium on executive power, 81
Ind. L.J. 1139 (2006); but cf. John Yoo, War By Other Means ch. 7 (draft) (arguing that Clinton’s and
Bush’s views of the commander-in-chief power are the same). We accept the possibility that Clinton’s
views and Bush’s views, although similar in broad contours, differ in important respects, but it is extremely
difficult to control for the different circumstances of their administrations – mainly, post- versus pre-9/11,
and unified versus divided government. It is also much harder than these authors imply to argue that one
president’s view is superior to the other’s on normative grounds. Such an argument depends on a theory of
presidential power, which is a deeply controversial subject.
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II. The Signing Statement: Background
A. History Prior to Bush II
Although the earliest signing statements were issued by Presidents Monroe and
Jackson, the signing statement did not come into widespread use until the twentieth
century. According to statistics compiled by the political scientist Christopher Kelley,
Hoover issued twelve signing statements; FDR issued 51; Truman issued 118;
Eisenhower issued 145; Kennedy issued 80; and Johnson issued 302. The remaining
presidents up until Bush II issued between 100 and 400 signing statements during their
administrations, averaging about 35 to 60 per year.15
Presidents use signing statements for diverse purposes. Many signing statements
express general policy views without asserting that the bill must be interpreted or limited
in some fashion. President Truman, for example, declared that various provisions of the
Displaced Persons Act (which granted visas to certain people displaced by hostilities
during World War II) “form a pattern of discrimination and intolerance wholly
inconsistent with the American sense of justice.”16 Presidents frequently sign legislation
while declaring that the legislation does not go far enough toward solving the problem at
hand, and requesting Congress to consider additional legislative proposals in the future.
In his signing statement for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
President Clinton complained that Congress did not adopt many of his proposals,
including provisions to expand the wiretapping authority of law enforcement agencies
and to ban “cop-killer bullets,” and asked Congress to reconsider its decisions in future
legislation.17 Many other signing statements have thanked constituents, praised or
condemned members of Congress, and praised members of the executive branch as well
as the administration itself.18 These types of signing statements have political value but
no legal effect, and so we will not address them further.
The kinds of signing statements that have produced controversy in recent years
also have substantial precedents in earlier administrations. We can divide these signing
statements into two types. First, constitutional signing statements declare that the
President will interpret a statute narrowly in order to avoid constitutional difficulties or
not enforce a provision that the President believes is unconstitutional. President Truman
interpreted a bill that provided for loans to Spain as an “authorization” rather than as a
“directive” apparently because the latter would violate his constitutional power over

15

Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement, Dissertation,
Miami University, Department of Political Science 192 (2003). We rely heavily on Kelley’s valuable
history in this part. Another valuable source on the history of signing statements is Phillip J. Cooper, By
Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (2002).
16
Kelley, supra note 15, at 65 (quoting Harry S. Truman, Statement on Signing the Displaced Persons
Act, Public Papers of the President, June 25, 1958, p. 382).
17
P.L. 104-132, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Statement by President
William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 1965, April 24, 1996.
18
Cooper, supra note 15, at 213-15.
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foreign affairs.19 Presidents Ford and Carter frequently used signing statements to deny
the constitutionality of legislative vetoes.20 President Reagan stated that a statutory
provision that purported not to recognize the PLO would be interpreted as nonbinding
because otherwise it would conflict with the president’s recognition power.21 President
Clinton stated that the Department of Justice would not enforce a provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prohibited the transmission of certain abortionrelated speech over the Internet because the provision violated the first amendment.22
Second, interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements argue that
ambiguous provisions of a statute have a particular meaning, based on what the president
understands (or claims) the purpose of the statute to have been. President Truman
interpreted a labor statute that provided an ambiguous good faith defense to employers so
that the employer would have the burden of proof and could not avoid liability merely by
showing that it did not intend to violate a rule.23 President Reagan interpreted a
supplemental appropriations bill so that its restrictions on the promulgation of regulations
would apply only to the type of regulations specifically identified in the bill and not to the
regulatory program to which they were related.24 President George H.W. Bush’s signing
statement for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 advanced a narrow definition of disparate
impact by endorsing the statement of a Republican senator in the legislative history.25
President Clinton provided an interpretation of an ambiguous term in the Federal
Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, saying only that his interpretation was “consistent
with the clear intent of the Act.”26 In these cases, the president provides his understanding
of what the bill means, without trying to appeal to his constitutional powers.
Christopher Kelley argues that the history of the use of the signing statement
reflects the rise of the theory of the unitary executive, which he traces to the Reagan
administration.27 We partly agree but would put the argument differently. The increase in
the frequency of the use of the signing statement is related to the rise of the national
government beginning with the New Deal and, closely related, the concomitant transfer
of power from Congress to the president. As the federal government became larger and
claimed for itself greater power over areas of life traditionally left to the states, it became
necessary for Congress to pass more, or more far-reaching or comprehensive, statutes.
With more statutes, there would be more opportunities for conflict between Congress’s
19

Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Bernard M. Nussbaum,
Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, at 5-6 (appendix)
(Nov. 3, 1993).
20
Kelley, supra note 15, at 76.
21
Id. at 45 (citing Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 8, 1985).
22
Kelley, supra note 15, at 156.
23
Id. at 62 (citing Harry S. Truman, Statement on Signing Hobbs Bill, Public Papers of the President,
July 3, 1946, p. 337).
24
P.L. 99-349, Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 Statement by President Ronald Reagan
Upon Signing H.R. 4515, July 2, 1986.
25
Kelley, supra note 15, at 134.
26
P.L. 103-226, Federal Workforce Manufacturing Act of 1994, Statement by President William J.
Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3345, March 30, 1994.
27
Kelley, supra note 15, at 184.
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and the president’s constitutional powers, and more sources of legislative ambiguity.
Presidents have quite naturally sought to defend their constitutional prerogatives and to
advance interpretations of ambiguous statutes that might otherwise be applied
inconsistently with these prerogatives. The signing statement became an instrument by
which they have accomplished these functions.
At the same time, as the national government grew, much of the day-to-day
regulatory power moved from Congress to the president. Congress created enormous
agencies, placed them in the executive branch, and ordered the agencies to issue
regulations. Congress transferred this authority to the executive because it lacked the
institutional capacity to make the kind of day-to-day regulation that it believed necessary
in a modern, national economy, but it also tried to retain as much oversight control as it
could. These efforts led to repeated clashes with presidents, who were willing to
administer the regulatory edifice but believed that congressional micromanaging violated
their constitutional powers. Signing statements became one of the ways that presidents
have asserted their constitutional understandings. Thus, the increasingly frequent use of
signing statements since FDR can be attributed to the gradual transfer of authority from
Congress to the president as well as the growth of the national government itself. Indeed,
many other indicia of executive power show its advance during this period—for example,
presidents used executive orders very rarely prior to the twentieth century, quite
frequently during the twentieth century, with their greatest use occurring during the FDR
and Truman administrations.28
What does seem to be relatively new with Reagan is the use of the signing
statement to declare with some frequency that the president would not enforce provisions
or interpret them narrowly. This did occur occasionally prior to Reagan, as we noted
above. But with Reagan, the practice became routine, and was continued by all
subsequent presidents. Reagan’s attorney general, Edwin Meese, argued more vigorously
and explicitly than any of his predecessors that the President’s views on the constitution,
whether put in signing statements or elsewhere, should be given significant weight.29 We
conjecture that the rise of this more aggressive use of the signing statement resulted from
efforts by presidents to reclaim executive power in the wake of the Watergate scandal and
the congressional reaction of the 1970s, which involved the enactment of numerous laws
intended to constrain the executive—including the War Powers Resolution and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.30
B. Bush II
Like the signing statements of other recent presidents, President’s Bush’s signing
statements fall roughly into three overlapping categories: statements made for public
relations or political purposes; statements that express constitutional objections to or
concerns about statutory provisions and thereby either suggest that they are not binding
on the President or that they will be interpreted in a manner that avoids the objection or
28

See Mayer, supra note 13, at 71.
See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987).
30
See Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency 423 (2004).
29
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concern; and statements that express a view about the meaning of an ambiguous statutory
provision.
Bush has often used signing statements at least partially for political or public
relations purposes. For example, of the 24 signing statements that Bush issued in 2001,
half of them were purely for political or public relations purposes, although it appears
that there are fewer pure political/public relations signing statements in subsequent years.
In signing into law a bill that repealed a regulation concerning ergonomics, Bush stated
that the measure “repeals an unduly burdensome and overly broad regulation” and further
criticized the regulation as something that “would have costs both large and small
employers billions of dollars and presented employers with overwhelming compliance
challenges.”31 This statement made no claim about the meaning of statutory provisions
and did not raise any constitutional objections about the bill. Similarly, in signing a
supplemental appropriations bill in 2001, Bush “commend[ed] the Congress for
expeditiously providing critical resources needed to improve our support for our men and
women in the military while maintaining a strict fiscal discipline.”32 The use of signing
statements to make these sorts of political or public relations statements is not
controversial.
Many of Bush’s signing statements refer to constitutional objections or concerns
implicated by one or more statutory provisions (often in addition to making public
relations statements). These constitutional objections typically relate to asserted
encroachments on executive authority. For example, Bush’s statements have objected to:
•

•
•
•

31

Provisions directing the executive branch to submit proposals or
recommendations to Congress on particular topics, on the ground that they
interfere with the constitutional authority of the President to “recommend . . . such
Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”33
Restrictions on the President’s ability to appoint officers or vest appointment
authority in entities other than the President, on the ground that they violate the
Appointments Clause.34
Provisions requiring the submission of information to Congress, on the ground
that they may interfere with the President’s authority to withhold information for
various reasons, such as harm to national security.35
Provisions directing the executive branch to take particular positions in
international negotiations or before international bodies, or to report on

Statement on Signing Legislation To Repeal Federal Ergonomics Regulations (Mar. 20, 2001).
Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2001 (July 24, 2001).
33
See, e.g., Statement on Signing Legislation To Provide for Improvement of Federal Education
Research, Statistics, Evaluation, Information, and Dissemination, and for Other Purposes (Nov. 5, 2002).
34
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the
Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 (Nov. 30, 2005).
35
See, e.g., Statement on Signing Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Dec. 7,
2004).
32
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•
•
•

international negotiations, on the ground that they interfere with the President’s
management of foreign affairs.36
Limitations on the use of U.S. armed forces, on the ground that they interfere with
the President’s Commander in Chief authority.37
Provisions that regulate how actions are to be taken within the executive branch,
on the ground that they interfere with the President’s authority to supervise the
“unitary executive branch.”38
Legislative veto and approval provisions on the ground that they are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.39

Many of Bush’s signing statements refer to multiple constitutional concerns, with
the highest number often being raised in connection with appropriations bills. In signing
an appropriations bill in November 2001, for example, Bush raised constitutional
concerns about requirements regarding the organization of the Department of Justice’s
efforts to combat terrorism; a requirement that the President submit a legislative proposal
to Congress concerning compensation for victims of terrorism; and a prohibition on the
use of appropriated funds for cooperation with, or assistance or other support to, the
International Criminal Court. He also noted at the end of his signing statement that
“several other provisions of the bill unconstitutionally constrain my authority regarding
the conduct of diplomacy and my authority as Commander-in-Chief,” and that he would
“apply these provisions consistent with my constitutional responsibilities.”40 In his
signing statements for the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005, Bush referred to constitutional concerns relating to dozens
of provisions.41
Most of the time, when Bush has identified a constitutional concern, he has stated
that he will construe the statutory provision in question in a manner to avoid the concern.
For example, in signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Control
Act of 2001, Bush noted that a section of the Act required the Secretary of Agriculture to
submit certain reports to committees and subcommittees of Congress, and he explained
that this section “will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to recommend to the consideration of the Congress such
36

See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Sept. 30,
2002); Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006 (Nov. 14, 2005).
37
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 (Oct. 28, 2004).
38
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Dec. 8, 2004).
39
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2004 (Nov. 10, 2003). For additional discussion of the types of constitutional concerns raised in
President Bush’s signing statements, see Statement of Michelle E. Boardman, Presidential Signing
Statements, Before U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 7-9 (June 27, 2006), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=5479; Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 9, at
522.
40
Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002 (Nov. 28, 2001).
41
Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (Jan. 23, 2004); Statement on
Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Dec. 8, 2004).
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measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient.”42 Similarly, in signing an
appropriations act for the Department of the Interior, he noted that “[s]everal provisions
in the bill purport to require congressional approval before executive branch execution of
aspects of the bill,” and that he would “interpret such provisions to require notification
only, since any other interpretation would contradict the Supreme Court ruling in INS v.
Chadha.”43
For many of his constitutional objections, Bush has addressed the issue by
interpreting statutory language that otherwise appears to be mandatory as being merely
advisory. For example, in signing the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 2002, he
stated that a provision that called for the Department of State to provide briefings to
congressional committees concerning certain discussions with foreign governments “shall
be construed as advisory only, given the constitutional powers of the President to
supervise the executive branch and to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs, which
includes the authority to determine what information about international negotiations
may, in the public interest, be made available to the Congress and when such disclosure
should occur.”44 Similarly, in signing the National Science Foundation Authorization Act
of 2002, he noted that a section of the bill “purports to condition authorizations of certain
appropriations on a subsequent determination by the Congress of the existence of
successful progress by the executive branch toward specified goals,” and that “[t]he
executive branch shall construe the purported condition as advisory, since any other
construction would be inconsistent with the principles enunciated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1983 in INS v. Chadha.”45
In some signing statements, Bush has indicated that he would at least partially
comply with statutory provisions that he thought were constitutionally problematic,
particularly provisions relating to notice or reporting to Congress, “as a matter of
comity.” He did so, for example, in connection with the above-noted objection to the
reporting provision in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 2002, stating “[t]he
Secretary of State will, however, as a matter of comity between the executive and
legislative branches, keep the Congress appropriately informed of the matters addressed
by [this section].”46 Similarly, in signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act of
2004, Bush noted that some sections “provide for notice to the Congress of relocation of
activities between military installations, initiation of a new installation abroad, or U.S.
military exercises involving $100,000 in construction costs,” that “[t]he Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that the President's authority to classify and control access
to information bearing on national security flows from the Constitution and does not
depend upon a legislative grant of authority,” and that “[a]lthough notice can be provided
42

Statement on Signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Control Act of 2001
(May 24, 2001).
43
Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002
(Nov. 5, 2001).
44
Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2002 (Jan. 10, 2002).
45
Statement on Signing the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 (Dec. 19, 2002).
46
Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2002 (Jan. 10, 2002).
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in most situations as a matter of comity, situations may arise, especially in wartime, in
which the President must act promptly under his constitutional grants of executive power
and authority as Commander in Chief while protecting sensitive national security
information.”47
Bush has only rarely issued statements interpreting a statutory provision for nonconstitutional reasons. He has done so to address accidental references or omissions in
statutory language.48 He has also occasionally done so to clarify statutory references.49
Most famously, in his signing statement for the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005, Bush
asserted that the restrictions on habeas corpus in the Act applied to pending cases,50 a
proposition subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.51 In signing the Corporate
Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002, also known as “SarbanesOxley,” Bush issued two signing statements, one formal and the other informal. In the
informal statement, he said that he would construe a whistleblower protection provision
narrowly. After subsequent pressure from Congress and interest groups, the executive
branch changed its position and accepted a broader interpretation of the provision.52
C. Bush II v. Clinton
It has been widely asserted that the Bush administration’s practice with respect to
signing statements has been unusual in nature and unprecedented in number. Senator
Specter has noted that, “[t]here is a sense that the president has taken signing statements
far beyond the customary purview.”53 As we noted earlier, it was reported in the press in
April 2006 that President Bush had already asserted the authority to disregard “more than
750 laws since he took office,” something “unprecedented in US history.”54 The political
47

Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004 (Nov. 22, 2003).
See Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (May
14, 2002) (“Section 2(4)(G) of the Act defines as a Federal law enforcement agency the ‘Coastal Security
Service.’ Because no such agency exists, and the principal agency with coastal security functions is the
U.S. Coast Guard, the executive branch shall construe this provision as referring to the Coast Guard.”);
Statement on Signing the Vicksburg National Military Park Boundary Modification Act of 2002 (Oct. 11,
2002) (noting that there was a missing word between ‘Secretary’ and ‘add’ and concluding that Congress
intended the missing word to be ‘shall’”).
49
See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Dec. 8, 2004) (“As is
consistent with the principle of statutory construction of giving effect to each of two statutes addressing the
same subject whenever they can co-exist, the executive branch shall construe the provision in the Energy
and Water Appropriations Act under the heading ‘National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons
Activities’ concerning transfer of funds from the Department of Defense to constitute an ‘express
authorization of Congress’ to which section 8063 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005
(Public Law 108-287) refers.”).
50
See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005).
51
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764-69 (2006).
52
See Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power – The Unitary Executive and the George
W. Bush Presidency, at 34-39 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.apfn.org/pdf/unitary_ExecutiveBush.pdf.
53
Weisman, supra note 8, at A09.
54
Savage, supra note 5. See also Boston Globe, Number of New Statutes Challenged, at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/statutes_challenged/ (chart purporting
48

12

scientist Phillip Cooper contends that President Bush has “expanded the scope and
character of the signing statement.”55
In this section, we try to evaluate this claim, focusing on a comparison between
Bush’s practice and Clinton’s. Clinton’s signing statements provide a natural basis for
comparison because Clinton was Bush’s immediate predecessor and belonged to the
other party. Of course, there is no reason to think that Bush’s practice should be identical
to Clinton’s. They could have good faith disagreement about the scope of executive
power. Moreover, if Bush has a more expansive vision of executive power, it could be
superior, on normative or constitutional grounds. In addition, the circumstances of the
two administrations are dramatically different—with Clinton’s taking place during a time
of peace and optimism, and Bush’s, except for part of the first year, occurring after the
9/11 attacks. These attacks allowed Bush to invoke the tradition of deference to the
executive during military emergencies, and perhaps made him more aggressive about
asserting presidential powers vis-à-vis Congress in his signing statements. We will return
to these issues shortly.
We begin with some numbers. Although Christopher Kelley and others have
provided useful statistics regarding signing statements, there is uncertainty about the
appropriate methodology (and Kelley has himself revised his statistics because of this),56
so we started from scratch and compiled our own statistics. The coding is not
straightforward and requires a lot of judgment. Hence it is not surprising that our
statistics differ in some respects from those compiled by others. But the major patterns
are the same, and so we are confident that our picture, in at least rough outlines, is
correct.57 Table 1 provides the data.

to show that the first President Bush challenged 232 laws, Clinton challenged 140 laws, and Bush II
challenged “at least 750” laws).
55
Cooper, supra note 9, at 516. See also Lithwick, supra note 4 (“[T]he difference between President
Bush’s use of the statements and that of his predecessors is a matter of frequency and kind.”).
56
See Media Watch, “And Then Spoke the ABA” (posting on July 24, 2006), available at
http://www.users.muohio.edu/kelleycs/mediablog.html.
57
We did not do the coding ourselves but used a law student research assistant who was directed to
apply the categories specified in the table.
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Table 1

Signing Statements, Aggregate
-- rhetorical
-- constitutional
-- legislative history
SS’s containing challenges, aggregate
Sections Challenged, Aggregate
-- SS’s with challenges to an undefined
number of sections
Average SS’s Per Year
-- average rhetorical per year
-- average constitutional per year
-- average legislative history per year
Ave. Yearly SS’s with Challenges
Ave. Yearly Sections Challenged
-- Ave. Yearly SS’s with challenges to an
undefined number of sections

Carter
225
193
16
16
32
39
2

Reagan
250
164
61
29
86
129
4

Bush I
228
121
98
21
107
169
29

Clinton
381
311
65
12
70
144
12

Bush II
131
25
104
27
106
844
14

56
48
4
4
8
10
1

31
21
8
4
11
16
1

57
30
24
5
27
42
9

48
39
8
2
9
18
1

25
5
20
5
20
162
2

Note: Bush’s aggregate number is through June 2006. Averages excludes 1981 for Carter, when he issued
one signing statement, and 2006 for George W. Bush because this was an incomplete year. Rhetorical
signing statements are purely rhetorical; no legislative or constitutional claims are made. Unlike others
before us, we classify signing statements as “constitutional” or “legislative history” only if they contain
legal claims. A signing statement with both constitutional and legislative claims is counted once in row 2
and once in row 3, but only once in row 1. We have separated out signing statements that challenge an
undefined number of statutory provisions, and do not attempt to estimate how many are in fact challenged.
Numbers have been rounded.

It is important to distinguish the number of signing statements that a president
issues and the number of challenges to statutory provisions that he makes in his signing
statements. In the first category, Bush does not differ much from his predecessors. In five
and one half years (ending June 30, 2006) he issued 131 signing statements, fewer than
Carter issued in four years. Bush issued fewer signing statements on an annual basis (25)
than any of his predecessors in our table, and indeed back to President Kennedy.58
Moreover, even if one considers only signing statements that challenge statutory
provisions, Bush is on the high end but still not outside the historical norm. His 20
signing statements per year with constitutional challenges are higher than Clinton’s (8)
and Reagan’s (8) but lower than G.H.W. Bush’s (24). When one includes challenges
based on legislative history, Bush’s number remains at 20 while Clinton’s rises to 9 and
G.H.W. Bush’s rises to 27.

58

See Kelley, supra note 15, Appendix 3.1 at 192 (approximate number of signing statements per year,
on average: Ford—52; Nixon—26; Johnson—60; Kennedy—40).
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However, Bush has clearly departed from the norm by frequently issuing
challenges to numerous statutory provisions within a single signing statement. On
average, Bush challenged 162 statutory provisions per year; by contrast Clinton
challenged 18 and G.H.W. Bush challenged 42. A typical Bush signing statement that is
not purely rhetorical might challenge a half dozen or more statutory provisions; other
presidents would typically challenge only one or two59—though Clinton in some cases
challenged a large number of provisions,60 and both presidents sometimes challenged an
undefined number of provisions.61
What accounts for the increase in the frequency of challenges within particular
signing statements? It cannot be attributed to an increase in the number of statutes or
statutory provisions, as far as we can tell.62 Nor does it seem likely that the 2001-2006
Congresses enacted more constitutionally problematic legislation than the 1993-2000
Congresses. Although legislation relating to the war on terror and war in Iraq might pose
more potential conflicts with executive authority than peacetime legislation, many of the
constitutional challenges are not related to foreign affairs, and Congress during much of
the 2001-2006 period was of the same party as the president.
When one compares the wording of the Bush II and Clinton signing statements,
there are striking similarities. Formally, the constitutional arguments made by Bush and
Clinton are extremely similar; indeed, they appear, for the most part,63 as roughly
identical boilerplate. And yet the same boilerplate is used to challenge many more
statutory provisions in the Bush signing statements.
As we noted above, Bush has objected to provisions directing the executive
branch to submit proposals or recommendations to Congress on particular topics, on the
ground that they interfere with the constitutional authority of the President to
“recommend . . . such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” Clinton used
the same language in a signing statement for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997:
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to develop a legislative proposal for establishing a case-mix adjusted
prospective payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the
59

Compare Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 (Nov. 10, 2005), with Statement on Signing the
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995 (Sept. 30, 1994).
60
E.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(Apr. 30, 1994).
61
See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Sept. 23,
1996); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2002 (Nov. 12,
2001).
62
Fewer statutes were enacted annually during the Bush administration than in prior administrations.
The numbers are as follows: Carter—314; Reagan—308; G.H.W. Bush—232; G.W. Bush—211. Source:
Westlaw database. Excludes 2006. We do not have data on how long these statutes are, but we find it
difficult to believe that statutes enacted during the Bush administration are substantially longer than earlier
statutes, and so the additional number of provisions explains the larger number of challenges in his signing
statements.
63
The one significant exception is the unitary executive theory, which we will discuss below.
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Medicare program. I will construe this provision in light of my constitutional duty
and authority to recommend to the Congress such legislative measures as I judge
necessary and expedient, and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including
the review of their proposed communications to the Congress.64
Bush has objected to provisions that restrict the President’s ability to appoint
officers or vest appointment authority in entities other than the President, on the ground
that they violate the Appointments Clause. Clinton raised the same objection in the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 1997:
One section of the Act, Section 1002, raises a constitutional concern. This section
establishes a committee empowered to select the entities to which certain historic
lighthouses will be conveyed. Because the committee members will hold a
Federal office and because this section vests them with significant authority, they
must be appointed as officers pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution. The Act, however, provides that the Secretary of Transportation
“shall” appoint four of the committee’s five members from among persons
recommended or designated by certain Maine officials or organizations. The
Appointments Clause does not permit such restrictions to be imposed upon the
executive branch’s powers of appointment. Therefore, I will not interpret section
1002(d)(3)(A) of the Act as binding, and I direct the Secretary of Transportation
to regard the designations and recommendations arising from it as advisory
only.65
Bush has objected to provisions requiring the submission of information to
Congress, on the ground that they may interfere with the President’s authority to withhold
information for various reasons, such as harm to national security. In signing a Joint
Resolution concerning U.S. policy towards Haiti, President Clinton stated:
In signing this joint resolution, it is important to clarify the interpretation of a
provision related to the President’s authority and responsibility as Commander in
Chief.
Section 2 of the resolution calls, inter alia, for a detailed description of “the
general rules of engagement under which operations of the United States Armed
Forces are conducted in and around Haiti.” I interpret this language as seeking
only information about the rules of engagement that I may supply consistent with
my constitutional responsibilities, and not information of a sensitive operational
nature.66
Bush has objected to provisions directing the executive branch to take particular
positions in international negotiations or before international bodies, or to report on
64

Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Aug. 5, 1997).
Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996 (Oct. 19, 1996). See also
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Sept. 23, 1996).
66
Statement on Signing Legislation on United States Policy Towards Haiti (Oct. 25, 1994).
65
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international negotiations, on the ground that they interfere with the President’s
management of foreign affairs. In his signing statement for the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1997, Clinton said:
Provisions purporting to require the President to enter into or report on specified
negotiations with foreign governments, as well as a provision that limits the
information that could be revealed in negotiations, intrude on the President’s
constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy and the President's role
as Commander in Chief. I will interpret these provisions as precatory.67
Bush has objected to provisions that limit the use of U.S. armed forces, on the
ground that they interfere with the President’s Commander in Chief authority. Clinton
raised the same objections in his signing statement for a 1993 appropriations bill.
However, I do have serious reservations about a provision in section 8151 of this
Act. I construe section 8151(b)(2)(ii) as not restricting my constitutional
responsibility and authority as Commander In Chief, including my ability to place
U.S. combat forces under temporary tactical control of a foreign commander
where to do otherwise would jeopardize the safety of U.S. combat forces in
support of UNOSOM II. Such U.S. combat forces shall, however, remain under
the operational command and control of U.S. commanders at all times.68
Bush has objected to provisions that regulate how actions are to be taken within
the executive branch, on the ground that they interfere with the President’s authority to
supervise the “unitary executive branch.” By contrast with the Bush administration,
Clinton never invoked the term “unitary executive” in his signing statements. However,
he did make the identical complaints, without using this term. For example, his signing
statement for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 said:
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to develop a legislative proposal for establishing a case-mix adjusted
prospective payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the
Medicare program. I will construe this provision in light of my constitutional duty
and authority to recommend to the Congress such legislative measures as I judge
necessary and expedient, and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including
the review of their proposed communications to the Congress.69
Similarly, in signing the Treasury and General Government Act, President Clinton stated:
Section 640 of the bill prohibits the use of appropriations to pay the salary of any
officer or employee of the Federal Government who interferes with certain
communications or contacts between other Federal employees and Members of
67

Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Sept. 23, 1996).
See also Statement on Signing Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Mar. 12, 1996).
68
Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994 (Nov. 11, 1993).
69
Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Aug. 5, 1997) (emphasis added).

17

Congress or congressional committees. I understand this provision is intended to
protect “whistleblower” employees who wish to inform the Congress of evidence
of violations of law or other wrongdoing in the Government. Any broader
interpretation of the provision that would apply to “nonwhistleblowers” would
raise substantial constitutional concerns in depriving the President and his
department and agency heads of their ability to supervise and control the
operations and communications of the executive branch. I do not interpret this
provision to detract from my constitutional authority in this way.70
The central tenets of the unitary executive theory are “the president’s power to
remove subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the
manner in which subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the
president’s power to veto or nullify such official’s exercises of discretionary power.”71 If
this definition is correct, then it appears to us that Clinton’s signing statements reflect this
theory.72
Bush also has frequently objected to legislative veto and approval provisions on
the ground that they are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v.
Chadha.73 Clinton did the same in a number of signing statements.74
Finally, we should mention that Clinton, like Bush on occasion, used signing
statements to advance interpretations of the legislative history unconnected to any
constitutional concerns. For example, in signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act in 1996, President Clinton stated:
I am very disappointed that the Congress included a controversial amendment of
the Railway Labor Act in this legislation without the benefit of public debate or
hearings. I have, however, signed H.R. 3539 into law because the sponsors of the
amendment and the Committee of Conference have assured me that section 1223
merely restores the exact legal standards for coverage under the Railway Labor
Act as they existed prior to the effective date of the ICC Termination Act of 1995.
Neither the amendments to the Railway Labor Act, nor the fact that it has been
amended, should be interpreted as affecting coverage under the Railway Labor
Act.75
Clinton’s and Bush’s signing statements have many other similarities. Clinton,
like Bush, objected to numerous different provisions in large bills, such as appropriations
70

Statement on Signing the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1997 (Oct. 10,
1997) (emphasis added).
71
Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the
Modern Era, 1945-2001, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 607 (2005).
72
The theory itself is quite controversial in academia, and it is probably no coincidence that Clinton
did not use the term itself.
73
Supra note 39.
74
E.g., Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
(Apr. 26, 1996).
75
Statement on Signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Oct. 9, 1996).
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bills.76 Both presidents interpreted statutory language narrowly in order to avoid
constitutional problems, and in similar ways—for example, interpreting mandatory
language as precatory.77
If Bush and Clinton rely on similar or even identical theories of executive power
in their signing statements, what accounts for the difference in the frequency with which
they challenge statutory provisions? One possibility is that the boilerplate language
masks important jurisprudential differences, which can be discovered only by consulting
OLC memoranda, litigation positions, the give-and-take with Congress reflected in letters
and other formal communications, and actual presidential orders. This possibility is
widely believed, but there are grounds for skepticism. Clinton’s Justice Department, for
example, advanced an expansive interpretation of the commander-in-chief clause in 1996.
Commenting on a bill that would have prohibited Clinton from using appropriations to
fund American troops under UN command unless he informed Congress of his intention
15 days in advance, the Office of Legal Counsel argued that such a provision violates
both the commander-in-chief clause and the President’s constitutional authority to
conduct diplomacy.78 Former Clinton DOJ officials who have criticized the Bush
administration’s views of executive power have passed over this OLC memo in silence,
and thus have not addressed the difficult question how Clinton would have acted in the
counterfactual world in which 9/11 occurred during his administration.79 Although we
have no doubt that lawyerly distinctions could be made, the unanswered question is
whether Bush’s executive jurisprudence represents a fundamental departure from that of
his predecessors, or a continuation. Until detailed comparative academic work has been
done, we think it hazardous to assume that Bush has issued more challenges in his
signing statements because he has different views about executive power, though of
course this may turn out to be correct. For now, the point to understand is that theories
articulated in the signing statements do not themselves provide evidence that Bush and
Clinton have significantly different views about the scope of executive power.
Another possibility is that Bush uses the same constitutional theories as Clinton
does, but applies them more systematically. Consider again the signing statements in
which Bush and Clinton invoke the commander-in-chief power in order to challenge
statutory provisions. Both presidents challenge provisions that control troop movements
and deployments, and that require reporting of information to Congress about
deployments and other aspects of military conduct, or notice to Congress prior to some
military action.80 Bush has also invoked the commander-in-chief power to challenge
76

Compare Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Oct. 23, 1998), with Statement on Signing the Military Construction
Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (Oct. 13, 2004).
77
Compare Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Oct. 27, 1998),
with Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Nov. 25, 2002).
78
See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Placing of United States Armed Forces
Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control, 20 U.S. Op. OLC 182 (1996).
79
See, for example, the articles in a symposium on executive power, 81 Ind. L.J. 1139 (2006).
80
Compare Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 (April 30, 1994); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Oct. 5, 1994); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Sept.
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attempts by Congress to regulate the number and types of defense department officials
who are assigned to “legislative affairs and legislative liaison functions,”81 and in other
ways to control the behavior or particular military personnel.82 And Bush has frequently
challenged attempts by Congress to require him to provide notice to Congress prior to
engaging in more humdrum activities like “relocation of activities between military
installations,” but even here the claim is only that during wartime reporting obligations
may be inconsistent with the president’s control over the flow of information that affects
national security.83 Of course, the Bush administration believed that the U.S. was in a
state of war when it issued that signing statement; the brief 1999 Kosovo intervention
aside, Clinton never claimed that the U.S. was in a state of war during his administration.
Finally, the most aggressive uses of the commander-in-chief power that we could find
were the well-known challenge of a statute that restricted the use of coercive
interrogation and a challenge to an effort to provide for independent auditing of the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.84
What are we to make of these differences? Many of the challenges may be
attributable to a more legalistic mentality; perhaps the Bush administration is like a
lawyer who writes “privileged and confidential attorney work product” on every
document he writes, even when it is extremely unlikely that the document will ever be
subject too discovery. People who have worked in OLC know that the Justice Department
has always made it a practice of sending “bill comments” to Congress, which object to
constitutionally problematic provisions in pending bills, especially provisions that
infringe on executive power. The bill comment practice was routine and bureaucratic; it
was intended to prevent Congress from interpreting a president’s silence about
constitutionally problematic bills as evidence that he was yielding his powers. The
practice appears to have migrated to the signing statement, perhaps because a statement
issued at the signing of the bill makes clear that any problems identified earlier were
never corrected. A few of the challenges—the two mentioned above—do seem more
extreme than Clinton’s. However, we do not know whether to attribute this difference to
different presidential philosophies or different circumstances. In the counterfactual world
where 9/11 occurred in 1993 rather than 2001, we just do not know whether Clinton
would have invoked his commander-in-chief power more rigorously and scrupulously,
especially when faced with more statutes touching on security concerns and foreign
affairs. The 9/11 effect may well be a major explanatory variable. Bush did not challenge

23, 1996); with Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005 (Oct. 28, 2004).
81
E.g., Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 (Jan. 10, 2002).
82
E.g., Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004 (Dec. 1,
2003).
83
E.g., Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2003 (Oct. 23, 2002).
84
See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005); Statement
on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Oct. 28,
2004).
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any provisions on commander-in-chief grounds prior to 9/11.85 Since 9/11, he has issued
thirty-six signing statements that include challenges on commander-in-chief grounds, or
about five per year.
We are left with more questions than answers but at least the landscape is a bit
clearer. Bush’s signing statements have not advanced novel constitutional theories but he
has applied them more aggressively than past presidents, objecting (for example) to
congressional efforts to control relatively humdrum assignments of military personnel as
well as to major troop deployments. However, we do not know whether these challenges
reflect deeper jurisprudential disagreements with his predecessors that are not revealed in
the signing statements but are described elsewhere (or not at all). He has also, in a few
instances, made claims that seem outside the norm. However, whether these additional
claims are objectionable depend on the answers to several questions.
First, are the claims mostly political rhetoric or does Bush act on them? Often, he
says (like other presidents) that he is not required to give notice to Congress about troop
deployments but will, when practicable, as a matter of comity. In practice, does Bush
provide more or less notice to Congress than prior presidents have done? A related
question is whether the provisions being challenged are important or trivial. As far we
have found, the critics of the Bush administration’s use of signing statements have not
identified a single instance where the Bush administration followed through on the
language in the signing statement and refused to enforce the statute as written.
Second, are the claims justified or unjustified? This is an extremely difficult
question. Clinton and Bush agree that the commander-in-chief power restricts Congress’s
control of military personnel. But how great is this restriction? As a matter of
constitutional theory and political morality, there is no obvious answer.86 It may be that
Bush has departed from precedent but has been justified in doing so.
Third, how do we account for the 9/11 effect? It is possible that Bush has (for
example) provided less notice to Congress about military deployments than prior
presidents have, but that prior presidents would have acted similarly in similar
circumstances. Evidence for this claim is that Bush’s own practice became more
aggressive after 9/11. But his critics see this as a subterfuge; they think that he exploited
9/11 to expand his power.
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But there is a confounding factor, which is that presidents generally do not use signing statements
aggressively in their first year, perhaps because their attention is focused on the transition from the prior
administration.
86
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“These cryptic words [of the Commander in Chief Clause] have given rise to some of the most persistent
controversies in our constitutional history.”). Similarly, with respect to the unitary executive, compare
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2 (1994). On the scope of presidential power generally compare Edward
S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 (1957), with Clinton Rossiter, The American
Presidency (1956).
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Fourth, it is possible that other presidents have used other instruments than Bush
for achieving the same ends. Perhaps, for example, other presidents have used executive
orders where Bush uses signing statements. We suspect that in many cases presidents did
not issue signing statements and simply refused to comply with statutory provisions that
they objected to, and Congress did not object; or if Congress did object, defended itself
by letter or else yielded to the pressure. If the only difference between Bush and these
other presidents is that he more often stated his objections in advance in a signing
statement, then this is hardly a matter of concern.
All of this suggests that Bush administration critics’ focus on signing statements
is misguided. If critics seek to attack the Bush administration’s views about executive
power, they need to focus on other documents such as OLC memoranda, and examine the
administration’s actions as well as its words. Presidents before Bush have staked out
strong positions on executive privilege, immunity of the president to criminal indictment,
and related issues; all of these positions, and actions based on them, need to be
considered as well as signing statements. If the critics believe that the signing statement
itself is constitutionally problematic, then they should not focus on Bush. They should
complain about the signing statement practices of Clinton, Reagan, Truman, FDR, and
James Monroe as well. But we will not let this inconsistency prevent us from inquiring
into the legal and normative basis of the signing statement critique, the subject of Parts III
and IV.
III. Legal Critiques of Signing Statements
Critics have questioned the legality of presidential signing statements when they
are used for purposes other than political rhetoric. In this Part, we consider the principal
legal arguments that have been made against signing statements. As we explain, most of
the legal arguments boil down to either disagreement with the perceived substantive
claims being made in the statements or a concern about judicial deference to the claims
and therefore do not provide a basis for concluding that the statements themselves are
legally problematic. Moreover, even on their own terms the arguments are simplistic and
unpersuasive. In this Part, we address only the legal issues. Many critics also suggest that
the phenomenon of signing statements has negative institutional effects—for example, on
the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches—without
necessarily suggesting that these negative effects result in illegality. We address these
institutional arguments separately in Part IV.
A. Constitutional Signing Statements
Critics have raised several legal objections to constitutional signing statements—
that is, statements in which the President raises constitutional concerns about bills that the
president has signed. Before considering these objections, we need to highlight a
preliminary issue that relates to these objections. The issue is whether the president has a
constitutional duty to enforce laws that he believes are unconstitutional.
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Commentators are divided over this issue.87 Some commentators argue that
presidents must always enforce a statute, regardless of whether they believe it to be
constitutional, unless and until courts hold that the statute is unconstitutional.88 Other
commentators argue that in the absence of a judicial resolution of the issue, presidents
have no obligation to enforce a statute that they believe to be unconstitutional—and,
indeed, may have an obligation not to enforce the statute.89 Still other commentators
argue for an intermediate position whereby presidents may sometimes disregard statutes
that they believe to be unconstitutional.90 There is also a related debate over the extent to
which presidents should presume statutes to be constitutional.91
Perhaps not surprisingly, presidents have often claimed the authority to disregard
statutes that they believe to be unconstitutional. For example, both Republican and
Democratic presidents have claimed that they are not bound by provisions in the War
Powers Resolution because these provisions unconstitutionally infringe on the
Commander in Chief power or—what is the same thing—interpret the Resolution
narrowly so as not to constrain them.92 Another, less controversial example is the
frequent statement by presidents that they are not bound by one-house or legislative
committee veto provisions, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha.93 On
several occasions in different administrations, the Attorney General or the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has expressed the view that presidents may decline
to enforce unconstitutional statutes.94 Equally unsurprisingly, Congress has sometimes
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contested the proposition that the president may refuse to enforce statutes that he views as
unconstitutional. Indeed, the asserted basis for impeaching (and almost convicting)
President Andrew Johnson was his refusal, on constitutional grounds, to comply with the
Tenure of Office Act, which was enacted over his veto.95
The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed this issue, although some if its
decisions and statements could be read as providing support for a presidential power to
disregard at least some unconstitutional statutes. Justice Jackson’s celebrated concurrence
in Youngstown appears to assume that under some circumstances the President may
validly “take[] measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”96
In Myers v. United States, the Court agreed with the President that a statute that required
Senate approval for removal of the postmaster was unconstitutional, and the Court did not
comment negatively on the President’s refusal to comply with that statute.97 And four
Justices in Freytag v. Commissioner stated in passing that the President has the power “to
disregard [laws encroaching on his authority] when they are unconstitutional.”98
We take no position on this issue because it is orthogonal to the legality of
constitutional signing statements. If it is proper for presidents to at least sometimes refuse
to enforce statutes that they think are unconstitutional, then announcing such an intention
in a signing statement cannot be illegal, and indeed it may be desirable to have the
president state his intention in this regard at the earliest possible moment so that Congress
and potential litigants can take it into account.99 Of course, presidents will sometimes
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make invalid assertions of unconstitutionality, and they may have an incentive to take
aggressive positions with respect to presidential power in particular. This simply means,
however, that the substantive views expressed in signing statements will sometimes be
legally problematic, not that the phenomenon of signing statements is itself legally
problematic. On the other hand, if you believe that presidents should never decline to
enforce statutes based on an assertion of unconstitutionality, then you will also believe
that they should not issue signing statements claiming this authority. But the problem
here will be the underlying views expressed in the statements, not the statements
themselves.100 Moreover, even if presidents accepted the view that they had to enforce all
statutes, constitutional signing statements could still play a useful informational role—for
example, presidents could use them to state that they were enforcing a statute under
protest, and perhaps also to direct executive branch lawyers not to defend the
constitutionality of the statute in litigation.
With these points in mind, we now consider the legal objections to constitutional
signing statements. One argument is that these statements constitute an abuse of the veto
process set forth in the Constitution.101 The Constitution provides that bills that are
approved by the House and Senate shall be presented to the President and that, if he
approves the bill “he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the
House in which it shall have originated.”102 If the President returns a bill, Congress then
has the constitutional authority to enact the bill into law over the President’s objection
upon a two-thirds vote in both Houses.103 The President improperly circumvents this
process, the argument goes, if he signs a bill and then states in a signing statement that he
has constitutional objections to it. In that situation, unlike with a veto, the bill is not
returned to Congress to give it an opportunity to enact the bill into law over the
President’s objection.
This argument is unpersuasive, for several reasons. First, in the signing statement,
the President is not purporting to use his presidential authority to block enactment of the
law, which is what happens with a veto. Instead, he is claiming that the Constitution itself
blocks the law from taking effect. He may or may not be right about such a claim, but his
position is different from when he exercises a veto. For example, unlike with a veto, the
president cannot legitimately announce that he will not enforce a statute because merely
because he disagrees with it as a matter of policy.
Second, the effect of the signing statement is also different than a veto. Among
other things, the statute remains on the books, available for application by courts (if they
find it to be constitutional) or by a subsequent president with different constitutional
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views. By contrast, a bill that is vetoed never becomes law, for either the courts or the
Executive, unless and until it is reenacted by a supermajority of Congress.
Third, it is unlikely that a constitutional signing statement changes the outcome
that would result if the bill were instead returned to Congress and then reenacted over the
President’s veto. In either case, if the President believes that he should not execute
unconstitutional laws, then he will not do so.
Finally, the president and his subordinates can uncontroversially announce their
views about the constitutionality of a statute in other contexts—in internal
communications within the executive branch, for example. Indeed, the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel does this routinely. It is difficult to see why it
suddenly becomes legally problematic for the president to state such views in a signing
statement.
A related argument is that constitutional signing statements constitute improper
“line-item” vetoes.104 The Supreme Court has held that a line-item veto, whereby a
president cancels or alters legislation after it is enacted, is unconstitutional even if
approved in advance by Congress.105 When he states in a signing statement that he will
not give effect to a statutory provision because he believes it to be unconstitutional, the
argument goes, he is in effect exercising a line-item veto. Indeed, unless his objection
relates to the entire bill in all of its applications, which is unlikely, then the president can
be seen as accepting the portions of the legislation that he approves and canceling those
portions that he disapproves, or “cherry-picking” the legislation, which is exactly what
would happen with a line-item veto.
This argument is also unpersuasive, for essentially the same reasons why the veto
abuse argument is weak. When the President issues a constitutional signing statement, he
is not purporting to use any executive authority to cancel all or part of a statute. He is
making a claim about the effect of the Constitution on the legal effect of the statute. He
may also be signaling his unwillingness to enforce a statute that he believes is
unconstitutional in the absence a judicial resolution of the matter, something that he could
do outside the context of a signing statement. If it is improper for him to decline to
enforce a statute in that situation (an issue on which, as discussed above, we take no
position), then it will be improper regardless of the signing statement. Conversely, if this
is a proper course of action, it is hard to see how making that intention clear in a signing
statement renders it illegal; indeed, one might think that generally it is better for the
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President to make clear his views in this regard so that Congress can react if it so
wishes.106
Moreover, whether a President’s refusal to enforce a statute will have the effect of
preventing a provision from being enforced will depend on a variety of factors, including
the availability of judicial review. If judicial review is available, courts will make their
own assessment of the president’s constitutional argument, and they are unlikely to give
substantial deference to the president’s views of the Constitution. If they nevertheless
agree with the president’s argument, then it will be the judges’ construction of the
Constitution, not the political authority of the president, that nullifies the provision, and
the courts can also make a judgment about whether the provision is severable from the
rest of the legislation. In the absence of judicial review, the matter will be resolved, like
most separation of powers issues, through the political process. It is not clear that the
mere fact of the signing statement will affect how that process comes out, and certainly
critics have not presented any empirical evidence showing such an effect.
A different version of the veto abuse argument and the line-item veto argument is
the claim that the president has a constitutional duty to veto statutes he believes to be
unconstitutional. The argument here is that the president’s oath of office and the Take
Care Clause require him to enforce the Constitution, and that he violates this duty if he
signs into law a statute that he believes to be unconstitutional.107 The problem with this
argument is that it assumes its own conclusion that the veto is the only mechanism by
which a president can enforce the Constitution. If in fact the President also has the
authority to decline to enforce unconstitutional statutes (a proposition with significant
support, as discussed above), it is not clear why he cannot fulfill his duty to the
Constitution through such lack of enforcement rather than through a veto.108
Another argument made against these statements is that, by signing the
legislation, the President should be viewed as having waived constitutional objections.
Normally, however, structural constitutional arguments are not subject to waiver,
especially by branches of the government.109 No one would claim, for example, that
either the courts or a subsequent president would be bound by a president’s failure to
object to an unconstitutional provision. The waiver argument is particularly problematic
in light of the frequent use by Congress of omnibus, multi-subject bills. As a practical
matter, presidents will not be able to veto such a bill because of a single unconstitutional
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provision.110 And in other contexts, courts refuse to bind parties to unconstitutional
conditions.
Critics also have challenged the invocation of constitutional concerns in signing
statements to justify particular statutory interpretations. When presidents have
constitutional concerns, it is rare for them to announce in a signing statement that they
will decline to enforce a statutory provision. Instead, they frequently state that they will
interpret the provision in a way that will avoid the purported constitutional problem. With
respect to the ban on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees contained in the
Detainee Treatment Act, for example, President Bush stated that the executive branch
would construe the ban “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.”111 Critics contend
that this practice allows presidents to distort the meaning of statutes and thereby in effect
disregard or change them.
In considering this objection, it is useful to distinguish between situations in
which a statute is truly ambiguous, and situations in which the president is purporting to
interpret a statute in a way that is contrary to its plain meaning. When a statute is truly
ambiguous, it is difficult to see how it is legally objectionable for a president to adopt an
interpretation that avoids constitutional concerns.112 The Supreme Court regularly applies
such a constitutional avoidance canon when it construes statutes.113 One might object that
invoking mere constitutional concerns allows the president to disregard a greater number
of statutory provisions than if he had to take a firm position on its constitutionality. This
problem has been noted with respect to judicial reliance on the constitutional avoidance
canon. The objections to that canon as used by the courts, however, are less applicable to
the president. Critics have noted that judicial underenforcement of statutes based on
constitutional concerns will often be contrary to what Congress would have wanted.114
Unlike the courts, however, the president is a participant in the enactment of legislation,
as well as the actor responsible for enforcement of the legislation, so he has a stronger
claim than the courts to decide on underenforcement. Indeed, outside the context of
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signing statements, the executive branch in a host of situations uncontroversially decides
on the level of enforcement of statutory provisions.115
Critics are concerned, however, that presidents will apply the constitutional
avoidance canon even in the lack of statutory ambiguity. If this happens, however, then at
worst we have a situation of presidential non-enforcement based on purported
unconstitutionality. As discussed above, while there is debate about whether it is
legitimate for presidents to engage in such non-enforcement, that debate is orthogonal to
the validity of signing statements. If anything, signing statements that adopt a narrow
interpretation of a statute should be less of a concern than statements of non-enforcement,
since presidents are merely underenforcing the statute.116
Moreover, for many of the constitutional interpretive statements, it is not clear
that there will even be underenforcement. Many of the statements appear simply to be
placeholders to preserve an executive viewpoint about the Constitution, not an indication
that the Executive will decline to fully enforce a statute.117 Indeed, some of them
specifically note that, despite the alleged constitutional problems, the Executive will
enforce the statute “as a matter of comity.”118 For this and other reasons, it is not clear
that a higher number of constitutional signing statements (for example, in the Bush
administration) correlates with increased presidential noncompliance with statutes.
Richard Epstein has argued that signing statements could be the “opening wedge
to a presidential posture that judicial decisions may limit the president’s ability to use
courts to enforce his policies, but cannot stop him from acting unilaterally.”119 But
Epstein cites no evidence that Bush, who has been in office for more than five years, has
begun acting unilaterally on the basis of his signing statements. (Bush has, of course,
acted unilaterally at times but so have other presidents—consider the assertion of
executive privilege, for example.) Applying an “opening wedge” argument to Bush is
also exceedingly odd; such an argument would have been more appropriately applied to
Reagan or to an even earlier president, and yet the general growth of executive power
aside, no one thinks that earlier signing statements have enabled presidents to act
unilaterally.
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B. Interpretive Signing Statements
Interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements also have generated
controversy. Critics contend that, if courts give weight to these interpretive statements, it
will undermine separation of powers.120 Giving weight to these statements, the argument
goes, will in effect allow the President to legislate without following the process for
legislation set forth in Article I of the Constitution. Relatedly, critics suggest that if courts
give weight to signing statements, the President will in effect have the ability to exercise
a veto over legislation without being subject to having the veto overridden as provided
for in Article I, or will in effect be exercising a line-item veto.121 Alternatively, critics
contend that if courts give weight to interpretive signing statements they will be
improperly abdicating their authority to interpret the law.122 Consequently, the critics
argue, signing statements “should be given no weight by a court when interpreting the
intent of Congress.”123
There are a number of problems with this argument. As an initial matter, it is
important to note that the argument is not an objection to signing statements per se.
Rather, the objection is to the possibility that courts will give weight to such statements
when interpreting statutes. It is not clear at this point, however, whether and to what
extent courts will give weight to these statements.124 Nor have presidents claimed that the
signing statements are controlling on the courts.125
In addition, the argument fails to distinguish between various degrees of weight
that courts might give to signing statements. We are not aware of anyone who argues that
these statements should be dispositive or should trump clear statutory language. The real
issue, therefore, is whether they should be given some weight when statutory meaning is
otherwise ambiguous, in the same way that courts often give weight to pre-enactment
statements by members or Congress or congressional committees. If one concludes that
signing statements are a relevant piece of evidence concerning statutory meaning, then
relying on such statements would not amount to a veto or alteration of the legislation.
Moreover, the proposition that it violates separation of powers for courts to give
any weight to statutory interpretations by the executive that are announced after a bill is
signed into law is inconsistent with modern administrative law. Courts routinely give
deference to post-enactment statutory interpretations by executive branch agencies—
under the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines, for example. Courts give this sort of
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deference to Executive agencies because of their expertise and because Congress often
expects that agencies will fill in gaps and ambiguities in enactments. Moreover, courts
reason that, if Congress disagrees with the agency’s interpretation, it has the ability to
override the interpretation through new legislation. These justifications will likely apply
to at least some interpretive signing statements.126
In addition, critics of signing statements do not contend that it violates separation
of powers for courts to give weight to congressional materials when interpreting statutes.
Instead, they argue that signing statements should not be considered because these
statements, unlike congressional materials, do not help reveal the intent of members of
Congress.127 It is not clear from the text or structure of the Constitution, however, why
the views of the President are not relevant to the interpretation of legislation. Article I
provides that, absent a supermajority, Congress cannot enact legislation without the
signature of the President. In light of the difficulty of overriding a presidential veto, this
means that for most legislation the President is a necessary partner with Congress in the
enactment process. Since legislation reflects an agreement between Congress and the
President, the President’s views about the agreement are as relevant as Congress’s
views.128
To be sure, at the signing statement stage, the President may have more ability to
engage in cheap talk than a legislator commenting on a bill, because signing statements
occur after enactment. A better argument against giving weight to interpretive signing
statements, therefore, is that they are unreliable indicators of presidential understandings
of statutory meaning, and that they should be given no more weight than post-enactment
statements by members of Congress, which the Supreme Court has said provide “an
extremely hazardous basis for inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment.”129
We address this argument below in Part IV in comparing signing statements with preenactment legislative history.
If courts do not give weight to interpretive signing statements, it is difficult to see
how they could be legally objectionable. By necessity, the Executive Branch must
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interpret statutes in order to implement and enforce them.130 The President must also
interpret statutes in order to supervise the Executive Branch. If the President did not issue
signing statements, he would simply use other vehicles for statutory interpretations, and
those other vehicles would be less contemporaneous with the enactment of the legislation
and often less public. Critics of executive power, however, usually favor greater
transparency.
IV. Institutional Analysis
In this part, we consider signing statements from an institutional perspective.
Should presidents be criticized for and discouraged from using signing statements? To
answer this question, one must identify the damage that signing statements do to the
constitutional system. One might show, for example, that legislative outcomes in a world
without signing statements would be better than legislative outcomes in the world that we
have. Unfortunately, given scholars’ limited understanding of how American political
institutions work, and the existence of serious controversies about how they should work,
we cannot do more than provide a sketch of what a defense of signing statements would
look like. But we think that this sketch should be enough to throw the burden back on the
critics, who also need to overcome the presumption in favor of signing statements given
the lawfulness of signing statements and their historical pedigree.
We will start with some basic assumptions that we take from the most
sophisticated work on legislative institutions and statutory interpretation, the literature on
positive political theory (PPT). It turns out that many authors writing in this literature
disapprove of signing statements, so we will take their argument as our foil. After
describing the general approach of the literature to statutory interpretation, we will
discuss the critics’ argument. We then show that this argument is sustainable only on
narrow and implausible or controversial assumptions. PPT, in fact, shows that signing
statements do not raise distinctive problems in comparison with other legislative and
executive documents.
A. Background
The PPT literature treats statutes as the outcome of bargains between various
political actors who comprise the “enacting coalition.” The enacting coalition consists of
those parties whose approval was necessary for the enactment of the statute. Who belongs
to the enacting coalition depends heavily on context, but roughly one can say that the
coalition excludes people who vote against the bill and the extreme supporters whose
preferences were not shared by those whose votes were necessary to create a majority.
The coalition will also usually include committees whose approval is needed for a vote
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on the floor, the median voter in each house, and the president, unless he vetoed the bill
and his veto was overridden.131
The members of the enacting coalition play the role that contract parties do in the
economic analysis of contract law. In the contracts literature, scholars assume that the
contracting parties seek to make an agreement that maximizes the value of the
relationship. A hypothetical, complete contract would assign rights and obligations for
every possible contingency in a manner that maximizes value. Because of transaction or
bargaining costs, however, the parties must leave “gaps” in the contract. The role of the
court is to fill these gaps in a manner that maximizes the ex ante value of the contract—
or, what is usually the same thing, that provides the parties what they would have
bargained for if they had anticipated, and bargained over, the contingency. One can
similarly view legislation as having gaps because members of the enacting coalition
cannot anticipate and bargain over all possible contingencies that affect the value of the
legislative deal. If the analogy to contract law is right, then courts should fill the
legislative gaps with the terms of a similar hypothetical bargain—the terms that the
parties would have chosen because they maximize the value of the legislative deal.132
There are important differences between the contractual and legislative settings.
One can more reasonably assume that a deal that receives the consent of both contracting
parties enhances their welfare and, externalities aside, therefore social welfare as well,
than that a legislative deal that receives the consent of members of the enacting
coalition—a majority or perhaps supermajority of a group who very imperfectly represent
the interests of the public—maximizes social welfare. Nonetheless, the assumption that
courts should fill legislative gaps with terms that the enacting coalition would have
wanted rests on two plausible considerations. First, a pragmatic consideration is that our
political system assumes that Congress makes good law—or, at least, that new law is
generally superior to the status quo. Courts do not have the authority to reject this
assumption. Second, if courts did not enforce legislative intent when gaps exist, then
Congress would respond by passing new, more detailed laws. The additional bargaining
and drafting costs would produce no offsetting benefits. None of this is to say that courts
should always defer to legislative intent, and numerous doctrines—the constitutional
avoidance doctrine, for example—might be used to ensure that other values are not
ignored. And if courts cannot reliably determine legislative intent, then they should refuse
to fill gaps, thus encouraging Congress to write more detailed statutes.133 However, we
put these complications aside because courts do examine legislative history, and the
critics of signing statements do not generally object to reliance on legislative history.
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McNollgast and other authors argue that the enacting coalition’s intention –
meaning the joint intention on (in most cases) a compromise of everyone’s most
preferred version of the law—should be considered the meaning of the statute. However,
the statements of the members of the enacting coalition during the legislative process do
not necessarily reveal the coalition’s intention. The problem is that often a member lacks
an incentive to disclose the compromise meaning of the bill. A person who preferred a
more extreme or moderate version of the bill would like courts to interpret the
compromise language in the more extreme or moderate way. If the courts rely on
legislative history, that person has an incentive to insert statements in the legislative
history with her preferred meaning. McNollgast argues that these statements should be
given no weight.134
By contrast, some statements are credible, or at least more credible, because the
speaker would incur a cost if she said something else. For example, if a committee report
interprets compromise language in an extreme fashion, then the majority will vote down
the bill. If the committee prefers the compromise language to no bill at all (the status
quo), it would do better to report the accurate interpretation than the extreme
interpretation.135 Therefore, the committee report’s statement is (usually) credible.136
Similarly, language in an amendment that is voted down by the majority on the floor
provides a clue, by way of negative inference, of the meaning of the bill. Here the
majority’s vote is the credible statement; if the majority voted in favor of the amendment,
it would be worse off on the assumption that it prefers the unamended version of the
bill.137
In sum, when using legislative history, courts should focus (1) on the statements
of members of the enacting coalition, when (2) those statements are credible because the
member has an incentive to speak truthfully or at least partially truthfully.
B. Signing Statements
How do these considerations bear on presidential signing statements? Initially, to
keep the discussion simple, we will limit our focus to signing statements that provide an
interpretation of the statute based on nonconstitutional considerations. Further, we will
assume that a court will give weight to the signing statement in future litigation. We will
relax these assumptions in Section C.
The first criterion is that the president be part of the enacting coalition. As
McNollgast acknowledges, the president will almost always be a member of the enacting
coalition because he has the veto. Because Congress must craft the bill in such a way as
to avoid the veto, the bill will almost always reflect the president’s preference—except
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when the veto is overridden, in which case no signing statement will be issued.138 To be
sure, there are some circumstances where technically the president’s preference does not
affect the content of the bill. For example, if the president seeks a moderate bill that
slightly changes the status quo, the relevant players in Congress seek a more extreme bill,
but the president also prefers the extreme bill to the status quo, then Congress’s
preferences will determine the content of the bill; the president’s is irrelevant.139 But as
McNollgast acknowledge, these sorts of situations are more hypothetical than real; the
president’s influence is pervasive. The veto power is significant; also the president can
sometimes set the agenda by proposing legislation and using his political and institutional
resources (including his leadership of one of the political parties in Congress) to focus
Congress’s attention on his proposal. Therefore, it seems appropriate to assume that the
president is always a member of the enacting coalition except when his veto is
overridden.
The second criterion is that the president’s signing statement be credible.
McNollgast argues that it will not be credible because it occurs after Congress has voted.
Congress does not have the opportunity to reject the president’s statement; therefore, the
president will state his preferred interpretation rather than the actual compromise
interpretation.140 One might argue that the president’s signing statement is in this way no
different from the statements made by individual members of Congress who do not hold
committee or other leadership positions, or indeed from the statements made by members
of Congress after the bill has been passed and signed.141
To understand this argument, consider the following example. Suppose a liberal
president supports a bill that prohibits certain emissions of a certain quantity but would
strongly prefer a bill that bans these emissions altogether. The bill is ambiguous in part
because of different views within the enacting coalition, most of whom prefer the more
conservative version of the bill and would not vote in favor of the extreme interpretation.
Thus, the “intention” of the enacting coalition is the conservative interpretation—the
emissions are limited, not eliminated. The president keeps his mouth shut during
legislative deliberations while members of Congress advance the conservative
interpretation of the bill. The bill passes with a bare majority in each house. In the signing
statement, the president for the first time advances the liberal version of the bill. If he
expressed this view prior to the final vote, and courts would accept this view, the bill
would not have received a majority because a majority would not vote for a bill that
would be given the president’s interpretation by courts in subsequent litigation.

138

For an exhaustive analysis and empirical evidence, see Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining
(2000); see also Steven A. Matthews, Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game, 103 Q. J. Econ. 347
(1989).
139
McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 131, at 722-23.
140
Id. at 28; McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 131, at 726-27. In a short note, they repeat this
conclusion but also seem to qualify it, see McNollgast, Commentary: The Theory of Interpretive Canon and
Legislative Behavior, 12 Inter’l Rev. L. & Econ. 235, 237 (1992).
141
However, this type of material is sometimes used by courts. See Eskridge et al, supra note 128, at
306 & n.44.

35

Thus, if courts gave weight to the president’s signing statement, it would thwart
the will of the enacting coalition. One view is that this is the wrong outcome in itself; but
even if one does not hold this view, one must recognize that judicial deference to the
signing statement would create all kinds of difficulties. Next time around, Congress
knows in advance that the president will say one thing (or nothing) prior to the vote and
something else after the vote. As a result, Congress may vote down bills whose
compromise meaning it supports. Another possible consequence is that members of
Congress will need to extract a commitment from the president not to advance a new
interpretation in the signing statement. Even if the president can make a credible
commitment, the additional bargaining costs are a deadweight loss. A third possible
consequence is that Congress will need to expend additional time and energy crafting a
bill that is detailed enough to foreclose an interpretation the president would be likely to
advance in a signing statement. In these ways, giving weight to the signing statement
interferes with desirable legislation without having an offsetting benefit.
This is the argument of McNollgast and other authors. We think it suffers from
several difficulties.
First, the president’s statements in general are more credible than those of
members of Congress because the president is a more significant and visible figure, and
he is more of a repeat player; thus, he has more to lose if he loses credibility. A president
whose signing statement violates legislative bargains will have more trouble obtaining
Congress’s cooperation later on. He also might earn the distrust of other political actors
and voters. McNollgast seems to agree that general considerations of reputation
encourage political actors to be honest in other contexts. They point out that committee
chairs have an incentive to be honest because they fear retaliation by the congressional
leadership which can deprive them of their positions.142 But if this is true for committee
chairs, it is also true for the president. Congress, members of his party, interest groups,
and other parties with something at stake in the legislative process will refuse to
cooperate with him in the legislative process if he reneges on earlier deals by issuing
inconsistent signing statements.
Second, the president’s signing statement is not like the statement of a member of
Congress who is outside the enacting coalition or who has no incentive to speak sincerely
because the vote is past. The distinction is that the president will usually have a
significant role in the administration and enforcement of the statute, whereas the member
of Congress does not.143 This is true for an ordinary criminal statute that is enforced by
U.S. Attorneys or the Justice Department; regulatory statutes that are enforced by
administrative agencies such as the EPA; and even laws creating private rights of action,
at least to the extent that these laws overlap with other statutes that the president enforces
or have some relationship to the president’s constitutional powers such as his authority
over foreign relations.
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Thus, the statute in question may delegate authority to the president, and even
when it does not do so formally it will usually quasi-delegate, in the sense of implicitly
permitting the president to use discretion in enforcing the statute. Political scientists
generally support delegation from Congress to the president, citing the advantages for
Congress to leaving difficult policy questions to expert agencies that build up institutional
capacity in particular areas of policy.144 In doing so, Congress takes the risk that the
president will direct agencies to enforce laws in a manner that deviates from Congress’s
intent, but Congress reduces this risk in two ways. First, it can use the Senate’s adviceand-consent power, as well as Congress’s general authority over personnel decisions, to
ensure that the agency’s preferences do not diverge to far from Congress’. Second, it can
monitor the agency’s behavior and use the diverse tools at its disposal—control over
appropriations, oversight hearings, refusal to cooperate with the executive in subsequent
legislative initiatives, providing for judicial review,145 impeachment, and so forth—to
punish agencies that interpret laws in a manner that diverges too far from Congress’s
intention. Congress does not exercise perfect control over agencies, but the enormous
advantages in institutional division of labor outweigh the costs.
For similar reasons, conventional wisdom approves of quasi-delegations of power
to the executive whenever statutes that require executive enforcement are enacted.
Prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of criminal statutes is just one of many
manifestations of this view.146 When prosecutorial discretion is abused, Congress can use
its oversight tools to retaliate against the executive. So the possibility of exercising that
discretion in advance, in the form of a signing statement, should not raise any concerns.
Rather than classifying signing statements as insincere forms of legislative history, one
can more usefully think of them as policy statements by the executive that are constrained
in the same way that all other exercises of delegated authority are.
Third, as noted above PPT’s main assumption—that legislative cost reduction is
the goal of canons of statutory interpretation—ignores serious controversies about the
legislative process. An alternative view is that the president more accurately represents
the preferences or interests of the public as a whole than Congress does, because only the
president has a national constituency. If this were not at least partially true, it would be
hard to understand why the Constitution gives the president the power to propose, sign
into law, and veto legislation, which gives him considerable bargaining power and
therefore influence on legislative outcomes. Otherwise, we would have to criticize the
veto power as a legislative cost on par with judicial enforcement of signing statements on
PPT’s view. If we reject PPT’s extreme pro-Congress assumption, then it is simply
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ambiguous whether the additional bargaining power that the president receives in a world
in which courts give weight to signing statements enhances or reduces public welfare.
Further, if the president’s view better reflects the public interest than Congress’s does,
then we should support the signing statement. Although judicial deference to the signing
statement raises legislative costs by forcing the enacting coalition to be clearer, it also, on
the margin, will result in interpretations that better reflect the public’s interests.
Although the danger of post-enactment opportunism by the president is real, this
is something that can be constrained by courts. Courts can decide to give more or less
weight to the president’s views relative to Congress’s when deciding how to interpret a
statute. Courts that believe that the president has better incentives than Congress might
give more weight to the signing statement than to ordinary legislative history, but that
does not mean that the court would accept any kind of signing statement. Taking a cue
from Chevron,147 a court might give weight to a signing statement that provides a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Courts can also evaluate the credibility
of the interpretive signing statements based on a variety of factors including consistency
with prior signing statements and with statements by the president and other executives in
the legislative history, the consistency of signing statements with the statements of
members of Congress in the legislative history, whether they trigger disagreement from
members of Congress and so forth.
We can join the second and third points under the general claim that in the postChevron world signing statements are no more objectionable than exercises of
presidential power that are now seen as routine and uncontroversial. Chevron dealt with
formal delegations of power from Congress to the president; but its rationales for judicial
deference to executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes in such cases can be
extended to signing statements. The two rationales for Chevron deference were the
superior accountability and expertise of the president.148 Our first point was about
expertise: the president’s enforcement authority gives him expertise about how statutes
should be implemented. Our second point was about accountability: the president is more
accountable to the public than courts are, and thus more likely to act in the public’s
interest. In Chevron, the Supreme Court used these rationales to justify deference to the
interpretations of agencies that have formal rule-making or adjudicatory power.
Similarly, the president’s expertise and accountability provide courts with a reason to
give weight to signing statements rather than relying on their (the courts’) own ability to
resolve ambiguous language.149
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As we have noted, this reasoning has, in fact, been used by courts to justify
deference to executive interpretations of statutes in various settings outside the Chevron
setting. For example, courts give weight to executive interpretation of statutes that affect
foreign relations.150 Similarly, they give weight to executive interpretations of treaties.151
When an agency does not have the power to issue formal rules that interpret the statute,
the interpretation must be contained in other documents—memoranda, proclamations,
executive orders, internal guidance statements, and so forth. If it is more convenient to
advance these interpretations in signing statements, there is no reason to object to this
practice. Indeed, in some contexts it may be preferable to have the President commit to
an interpretation before specific controversies over the meaning of the law arise. In doing
so, the President enhances transparency about his legal views and enforcement agenda.
This proposition is also reflected in the disallowance of Chevron deference to executive
litigating positions, which seems to be based on the concern that litigating positions
might not reflect the considered view of the executive, or might be advanced for narrow
political reasons. Because signing statements are made in advance of any particular
dispute, and reflect the views of the president himself, it is less likely that they are
similarly tainted.152
C. Complications
So far we have discussed interpretive signing statements. In this section, we
expand our analysis by considering three additional issues. First, we address
constitutional signing statements. Second, we relax our assumption that courts give
weight to signing statements, and address the view that even if courts do not give weight
to signing statements, it is still wrong for presidents to issue them. Third, we consider the
differences between signing statements and other types of executive documents such as
executive orders.
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1. Constitutional Signing Statements
Many critics of signing statements have focused their attention on constitutional
signing statements, statements that declare that the president will interpret the statute in a
certain way, or not enforce certain provisions in the statute, because to do otherwise
would violate the constitution. Critics fear that presidents use constitutional signing
statements in order to rationalize executive aggrandizement at the expense of Congress
and other institutions. Consider President Bush’s statement that he will interpret a bill
that bans cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in a way that does not
interfere with his commander-in-chief powers, implying that Congress cannot prevent the
president from ordering subordinates to engage in such treatment during wartime.153
Critics who believe that no reasonable interpretation of this statute would violate the
president’s commander-in-chief powers assume that the president is implicitly proposing
more expansive powers than he already has. And even when there is a potential conflict
between the statute and the president’s constitutional powers, one might fear that the
president will use the statement to rationalize a refusal to enforce that statute even when
no such conflict exists.
As we noted in Part III, a standard response to the critique of constitutional
signing statements is that the president has a duty to comply with the Constitution—a
duty that can be tied to the Take Care Clause, if need be. Thus, if the president believes
that a statute violates the constitution, he has a constitutional obligation not to enforce
it.154 Announcing his view on this matter in advance, in a signing statement, is surely
preferable to waiting until litigation arises. By stating his view in advance, the president
gives Congress an opportunity to correct the statute, and also helps align citizens’
expectations with the law as enforced.
A critic might respond that the president should not exercise independent
judgment about the constitutionality of the statute. Congress’s implicit determination that
the statute is constitutional is entitled to deference; or perhaps the president should
suspend judgment until a court has ruled. These are all possible views, but they are hardly
uncontroversial. Whatever the truth, our point here is narrow, and should by now be
familiar. The criticism is not of the signing statement but of the content of particular
signing statements. If one believes that the president has the authority to refuse to enforce
statutes that he deems to be unconstitutional, then the only possible objection to a signing
statement that says as much is that it comes too soon. But we see no reason why the
president should defer announcing his view until litigation occurs. If one believes that the
president does not have the authority to refuse to enforce statutes that he deems to be
unconstitutional, that by itself is not sufficient for criticizing the statement of his views in
a signing statement. To hold that position, one would have to believe that the president
would have to keep silent about his constitutional views about a statute, a position held
by no one whom we are aware of. If the president has the right to state his views about
the constitutionality of a statute, then he should state his views sooner rather than later, in
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which case the signing statement would be the appropriate vehicle. And if the president’s
views about constitutional power are excessive, a court is free to disregard them.
The basic fear seems to be that the president will use the signing statement in an
opportunistic fashion to advance impermissible theories of executive power, and that
these theories might stick even if courts do not pass on them or even if they reject them.
How might such theories stick? We address this question in the next section.
2. Nonjusticiable Signing Statements and the Evolution of Constitutional Norms
Even assuming courts do not pay attention to signing statements, or are capable of
discounting those that make extreme claims about executive power, there seems to be a
lingering concern that the signing statement provides the president with an excessively
potent weapon in its continuing separation-of-powers battle with Congress. The concern,
discussed in Part II, that the president could direct subordinates to disregard provisions of
a statute can be recast as a fear that the president can too easily thwart the will of
Congress. A related concern is that by persistently advancing claims about executive
power against an often weak-willed and divided Congress, the president will eventually
persuade Congress, courts, or others that he has powers that he really lacks or ought to
lack. So even if courts do not give weight to signing statements, they cause harm to
constitutional norms and the division of powers between governmental units.
This argument is vulnerable to two objections. First, no one understands how the
president and Congress use their various institutional advantages to encroach on the
power of the other. Both sides have formidable tools at their disposal. The president is the
focus of the nation’s attention; he delivers nationally viewed speeches; he controls the
law enforcement activities of the executive branch; he can use executive orders and
proclamations; he can use the veto against statutes that implicitly deny him powers he
thinks he has. In taking these actions, the president can argue that his constitutional
powers are, or should be, greater than they in fact are (or should be), and if he persuades
his audience, then his constitutional powers may indeed advance. But Congress can
harass executive officials in oversight hearings; it can cut budgets, jurisdictions,
enforcement powers; it can require reports and audits; it can (though the Senate) vet
nominees and refuse to confirm them; it can order investigations of the president and his
subordinates; it can impeach the president. Congress frequently passes bills with
constitutionally dubious provisions that increase Congress’s power: consider its
continued use of one-House and committee veto provisions despite the Chadha decision.
Congress frequently passes multiple bills and omnibus appropriations bills that contain
numerous, unrelated provisions. These bills put the president in a difficult position. As a
practical matter, the President may need to sign these bills even if there are
unconstitutional provisions. Yet it is not self-evident that his behavior is “clearly
objectionable” if he refuses to subsequently enforce an unconstitutional provision. That
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this is a serious problem is recognized by many state constitutions, which require the
legislature to pass single-subject bills and give the governor a line-item veto.155
Given that both sides already have numerous tools for advancing their
constitutional understandings, and that one cannot say whether the one side or the other
has superior tools, whatever this might mean, it is impossible to say whether the signing
statement gives the president a significant advantage over Congress. It might give him no
advantage, a small but reasonable advantage, or it might make up for numerous
disadvantages.
Second, one’s position on these issues must depend on the resolution of a prior,
equally difficult issue, namely whether the president already has “too much” or “too
little” power relative to Congress.156 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., thought that the presidency
was too powerful when he wrote his book, The Imperial Presidency, in 1973. By the year
1998, he had come to believe that the president was no longer too powerful, but then he
changed his mind when he wrote the preface to a second edition in 2006.157 Schlesinger
did not, at any time, provide a theory that explains how much power the president should
have, so his judgments were no more than impressions. As we have noted, the executive
has gained power throughout American history, and particularly during the twentieth
century. Domestically, the president has become the leader of the regulatory state since
the New Deal. Internationally, the president has increasingly enjoyed freedom of action,
at least since the Spanish-American War. One cannot criticize the use of presidential
signing statements to aggrandize executive power without being able establish that the
president currently, under the right understanding of the constitution and American
political institutions, has the right amount of power or too much. Far too much
controversy exists on this issue for the criticisms of signing statements to be persuasive.
3. Executive Orders, Executive Memoranda, and Proclamations
One of our recurrent arguments is that signing statements are just one of many
tools that the president has at his disposal for controlling the executive branch. Other
tools include executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, agency rules, and internal
guidelines. To the extent that these other instruments are near substitutes for signing
statements, then even some kind of prohibition of or taboo on signing statements, if this
were possible, would have no effect on the conduct of the president. However, we have
not gone so far as to say that signing statements are identical to these other tools, and
indeed they are not.
The most interesting difference between a signing statement and the other types of
documents is that a signing statement attaches itself to a statute, and so may continue to
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have force after the termination of the administration, even if future presidents disavow
it. For comparison, consider the executive order. At the beginning of their administrations
presidents typically review executive orders from prior administrations, and repeal or
modify those that they do not agree with. No one doubts that presidents can do this.
Signing statements are anchored to statutes; executive orders float free.
Now, a president could also use an executive order to disavow a prior president’s
signing statement, or to instruct subordinates to disregard claims made in that signing
statement. However, it is imaginable that in future litigation a court could rely on the
signing statement and disregard the disavowal. This could happen if courts regard the
signing statement as a part of the legislative history rather than as an independent
statement of executive policy. When interpreting statutes, a court will rely on legislative
history to some extent, but it does not always pay attention to the interpretations of the
current president. In this way a signing statement could be a more powerful way to affect
interpretations of a statute than other executive instruments are—even more powerful
than a formal agency rule under the Chevron doctrine, which permits new presidents to
reject interpretations of earlier presidents.
We emphasize that this is a possible argument, and we do not know how courts
will act. But if courts do accept this argument, we think that this would on balance be a
good thing. The reason takes us back to the theory of statutory interpretation. As long as
the president is a member of the enacting coalition, then his contemporaneous
interpretation of the statute is entitled to respect. Just as courts rely on the enacting
Congress’s intention, not the intention of the Congress in session at the time of litigation,
they should rely on the “enacting president’s” intention, not the intention of the president
in office at the time of litigation. Indeed, courts do routinely rely on statements issued by
the executive branch regarding legislation under consideration.158
Conclusion
The critics confuse the medium and the message. The signing statement is a tool
for expressing a president’s view of a statute. The fact that presidents may use signing
statements to advance erroneous views about their constitutional powers or the meaning
of a statute is not grounds for criticizing the tool, just as policy disagreement about the
use of the veto would not be grounds for criticizing the President’s veto power. Like all
tools, the signing statement can be used for good or for ill. Confusion about this point is
evident in the debate about whether Bush has challenged “too many” statutory provisions
in signing statements, when the appropriate but neglected question is whether Bush’s
views about executive power are justified.
If courts do not give weight to signing statements, then the objections to this tool
are weak indeed. The signing statement is no more offensive than the memorandum, the
executive order, and the proclamation, and no one seems to want to ban them. Whatever
158
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one’s views of presidential power, the president has the right and perhaps even a
constitutional obligation to state his opinion about the meaning of a statute and whether it
violates the constitution. If it is more convenient to state this opinion in a signing
statement than in some other type of document, that is hardly an objection. Indeed,
stating his views about legislation at the earliest possible point increases transparency
about the executive’s intentions, which enable those who are affected by the statute to
adjust their behavior accordingly, and those who disagree with the President to mobilize
resources to litigate or obtain a legislative revision.
If courts do give weight to signing statements, then critics of the signing statement
should more appropriately complain about judicial than about presidential practice. But to
the extent that courts legitimately defer or give weight to the executive’s position on
some issue, and this is very common as we have discussed, then it seems that use of the
signing statement should be encouraged rather than criticized. When the president
expresses his view in advance rather than in litigation, there is less of a chance that the
view is opportunistic or politically biased, as courts have recognized. The signing
statement should thus be preferred to the litigation position. And occurring as it does at
the earliest point at which the president can express his views about a completed statute
(as opposed to bills earlier in the legislative process), the signing statement is an
attractive vehicle for doing so.
We have also argued that if courts are correct to examine legislative history, then
a signing statement should be examined as well, even though it comes after the vote. The
president has legislative power embodied in his veto, and thus his views about legislation
are entitled to some weight. The PPT models show that because Congress legislates under
the shadow of the veto, a bill will reflect the president’s view, even if only implicitly.
And because the president will almost always play a role in the enforcement of a statute,
his views about it, as embodied in the signing statement, are no more suspect than other
instructions to subordinates. Because he is a usually pivotal member of the legislative
coalition, because he is usually charged with enforcement in the statute, and because his
enforcement of the statute is politically constrained, his statement will often be useful
information about the meaning of the statute.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
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